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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-fifth session
Item 34 of the preliminary list*

POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Letter dated 19 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you, enclosed herewith, a Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, issued on 15 February 1990. I would very much appreciate it if you would have the text of the Declaration circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 34 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Alexander STRESOV
First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Declaration of the Government of Bulgaria issued on 15 February 1990

The Bulgarian people welcomed the long awaited release of Nelson Mandela, the universally recognized leader of the African National Congress, the fighter for human rights and social justice and laureate of the Dimitrov Prize. His release was the result of the struggle of the democratic forces in South Africa and the efforts of the international community directed at the elimination of the system of racism and apartheid in the country. It became possible thanks to the positive changes and trends in our world that took place as a result of the new political thinking and led to the granting of independence to Namibia, the starting of negotiations for a peaceful settlement to the internal conflict in Angola and to the strengthening of the democratic processes in the Republic of South Africa.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria sympathizes with the just cause of the people of South Africa and will continue to support actively their struggle for the complete elimination of the condemned system of apartheid. Our public regards the freeing of the legendary son of Africa, Nelson Mandela, as an important step on the road to the building of a non-racial society in that country. It is part of the success of the long years of struggle of all anti-racist and democratic forces and movements in the Republic of South Africa which have led to certain positive changes in the country.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses the hope that the processes of democratic change in South Africa will continue to broaden and develop in pursuit of the noble human ideals and for the establishment of the united, non-racial and democratic Republic of South Africa to which Nelson Mandela dedicated his life and struggle.

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POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Letter dated 20 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of a letter addressed by the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh, to Mr. Nelson Mandela and a statement issued by him on the occasion of Mr. Mandela's release.

I shall be grateful if you would have these texts circulated as official documents of the General Assembly under item 34 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) C. P. GHAREKHAN
Ambassador/Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

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ANNEX I

Letter from the Prime Minister of India to Mr. Nelson Mandela

The quarter century of your imprisonment has proved to the world, no less than to your erstwhile captors, the futility of repression and the hollowness of the system and ideology of apartheid. Your release demonstrates the supremacy of the human spirit and the inevitability of the triumph of justice and reason over the forces of racism, suppression and violence of man against man. Your indomitable courage and unshakeable faith in the ultimate victory of the basic values of humankind have made you more than a freedom fighter and a nationalist striving for the liberation of his country. You are today a symbol of the aspirations of all the down-trodden, exploited and oppressed people of the world.

We, in India, share the joy of your family which has suffered much over these many years, your people who have held high the banner of freedom in your name and all those around the world who have long awaited your release. The many other political prisoners who are still kept captive cannot be forgotten in this moment of happiness. Their release now becomes even more pressing and, I am sure, with statesmanship, this goal too will be soon achieved. Your people will need your invaluable experience, your indomitable courage and your foresight in the coming days in the search for a non-violent way to the dismantlement of apartheid.

Your release gives us the opportunity to reassert our belief that victory lies in the pursuit of truth. India's support to your cause has been and will remain staunch and unwavering. We will continue to contribute to your struggle for an apartheid-free, non-racial and united South Africa.

In welcoming you on your release, I extend to you a warm invitation to visit India as our honoured guest.

(Signed) Vishwanath PRATAP SINGH

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ANNEX II

Statement by the Prime Minister of India on the occasion of the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990

We have learnt with great joy that Nelson Mandela has been released today from prison. We salute this great fighter for liberty, justice and equality. He is the greatest symbol today of the human spirit which refuses to surrender to oppression.

The people of India have always supported the struggle against apartheid.

Gandhiji's life and struggle amongst the people of South Africa was dedicated to the pursuit of truth. That is where he devised his unique political instrument of Satyagraha. The ideal of Mandela, like that of Gandhiji, was that humanity be freed from oppression and humiliation.

I have set up a national committee to celebrate his release. It is my hope that this celebration will symbolize the victory of the human spirit and dignity of man. I have invited Nelson Mandela to visit India and we hope that we will be able to celebrate that occasion also soon.

Let Mandela's release herald the beginning of negotiations between the true representatives of the people. Those who have so far made such efforts to support the freedom struggle of the people of South Africa, must maintain their vigilance. All our strength and pressure must be directed towards the complete dismantlement of apartheid. Let Mandela's release be a harbinger of a new, united democratic and non-racial South Africa.

I greet Nelson Mandela, the symbol of the freedom of man. I greet you all my countrymen and women in this spirit. I invite you all to celebrate this joyous occasion.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 32 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 20 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a press communiqué of the National Government of Cambodia, dated 17 February 1990.

I should be very grateful if you would have the press communiqué of the National Government of Cambodia circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative
of Cambodia to the United Nations

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

PRESS COMMUNIQUE
OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA

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1. On 17 February 1990, the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) held a meeting under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. SON SANN, Prime Minister of the NGC, with the participation of H.E. Mr. KHIEU SAMPHAN, Vice-President of Cambodia in charge of Foreign Affairs, and H.R.H. Prince NORODOM RANARIDDH, Personal Representative of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK in Cambodia and Asia, as well as a number of other NGC's Ministers.

2. The Council of Ministers has reviewed the situation in all fields of the Cambodian people's struggle to regain national independence and sovereignty.

The Council of Ministers would like to pay heartfelt tribute to all the Cambodian patriots for their lofty sacrifices to make it possible for the progress on the battlefield.

3. The Council of Ministers would like also to reiterate the readiness of the National Government of Cambodia to seek a comprehensive settlement to put an end to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

In this respect, the Council of Ministers is of the view that the Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in Jakarta, to be convened in the framework of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC), should have an agenda dealing with all the aspects of a comprehensive settlement, and the PICC rules of procedure especially the unanimity rule.

4. The Council of Ministers would like to take this opportunity to renew the deep gratitude of the people of Cambodia and the NGC under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK, President of Cambodia, to all peace-, justice- and freedom-loving countries the world over for their invaluable support to the Cambodian people's struggle, and would like to appeal to them to continue to do so until Cambodia become once again 100 per cent independent.

17 February 1990

(Signed):	(Signed):	(Signed):
SON SANN	KHIEU SAMPHAN	NORODOM RANARIDDH

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SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Letter dated 16 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose the text of an article entitled "Afghanistan - the difficult road to peace", by E. A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was published in "Izvestia" on 15 February 1990.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the article circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 29 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. BELONOGOV

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Afghanistan - the difficult road to peace

Today, 15 February, marks the anniversary of the day when the last Soviet soldier left Afghan soil. That occasion was, it may be stated without exaggeration, one which left its mark on the hearts of all Soviet people. They awaited, discussed and lived through it with impatience.

Let's be candid, up until then many people, both here at home and abroad, had not been able fully to define their attitude to the aims of perestroika. That test in political responsibility was one we had to pass both then and later on. The courageous and honest verdict on that decision in December 1979 to send troops into Afghanistan was returned by the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

The leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan also passed that test honourably by demonstrating, in very difficult circumstances, that its platform enjoyed broad support among Afghans. It embarked on the course of seeking a political solution of the Afghanistan problem on local soil.

And yet, in talking about the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, it is probably right to recall in the first place the domestic aspect of that event, to set it in the overall context of the processes of perestroika taking place in our country. Having embarked on the course of perestroika, we could not ignore the fact that Soviet troops were fighting in Afghanistan, that the blood of Soviet soldiers was being shed there.

The road to the withdrawal of our forces was not an easy one. Getting into the Afghanistan conflict was easier than getting out of it. A complex tangle of conflicts was formed which threatened far-reaching political and social upheavals. It had to be disentangled without delay. We put the Geneva negotiating process into high gear. A difficult diplomatic campaign had to be waged. It culminated in the signing on 14 April 1988 of the Geneva Accords, and we were able to begin withdrawing our troops.

Now that all that is behind us, we cannot but give their due not only to the participants in the historic international agreements on Afghanistan, but also to all those who, in one way or another, to a greater or lesser extent, contributed to the reaching of those agreements. Among them, particular mention must be made of India, which invariably took a constructive attitude and made a substantial contribution to the common effort. Our thanks also go to the People's Republic of China, which above all, as a neighbouring country, played an important role in maintaining the necessary atmosphere around the talks.

And of course, there could hardly have been any agreement if the position of Iran had not been favourable.

Naturally, this turning point had not only a domestic, but also a clearly delineated international dimension. As M. S. Gorbachev said at the Nineteenth

All-Union Party Conference, the Geneva Accords "have become an important international milestone in the political settlement of regional conflicts which threaten peace as a whole and slow the progress of peoples". The breakthrough on Afghanistan convincingly demonstrated that the new political thinking in international affairs also involved practical action to strengthen trust among States and peoples and break deadlock in the most complex situations. The precedent of Afghanistan had a certain impact on the ending of the war between Iran and Iraq, the resolution of the Angola-Namibia situation, and the strengthening of the movement to find mutually acceptable compromise solutions in South-East Asia and Central America.

Last - and perhaps most important - there has been a qualitative change in the situation both within Afghanistan itself and around it. Within the extremely non-homogeneous society of Afghanistan and in the world as a whole, a basic consensus is emerging that there is no alternative to a political solution of the Afghanistan problem. The large mass of Afghanistan's population is sick to death of war, and has recognized the futility and pointlessness of continuing the bloodshed.

However, this truly nation-wide aspiration for peace has not yet been transformed into the concrete decisions which would be taken as a result of a dialogue among all Afghans, and indeed this dialogue has not yet begun. In these circumstances, the position of the Government of Afghanistan and of President Najibullah is extremely important, and this position is distinguished by its constructiveness and flexibility. Just a few days ago, the President, speaking in Kabul, again confirmed his readiness to look for ways of bringing about a peaceful settlement. But for the time being, progress is being held back by the unrealistic conditions the opposition is attaching to the opening of a dialogue.

Nevertheless, there are some hopeful signs. Today we can speak - although as yet only for the most part on the conceptual, philosophical level - of the emergence of points of contact in the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States, which together with the USSR is a guarantor of the Geneva Accords. Primarily, this involves a joint conclusion regarding the need to search for political ways of resolving the issue and to establish a "transition period" during which national reconciliation would be achieved and a new structure of State power in Afghanistan would take shape. This may not look like much, but it is no small achievement, especially if we bear in mind how complex this problem is. Just recently, issues relating to Afghanistan were the subject of in-depth discussion during the talks with United States Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow. This discussion again confirmed the possibility of further stepping up the two countries' joint efforts towards a settlement in Afghanistan.

A great deal depends on the position of Afghanistan's neighbours - Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, as can be seen, the process is under way, albeit slowly and with great difficulty, of reassessing values and bringing official objectives into line with the real situation in Afghanistan. On the whole, a constructive policy is being pursued in Iran, where, in particular, emphasis is placed on the role that the countries of the region might play in an Afghanistan settlement.

And even when we look at the opposition, it is apparent that there, too, an understanding is beginning to gain ground of the inevitability of intra-Afghan problems being solved through a dialogue in which the whole range of political forces in Afghanistan will participate. And we are speaking here of a fairly broad range of opposition, starting with the field commanders and ending with the moderate leaders of the "Alliance of Seven".

There is thus every ground for stating that genuine prerequisites now exist for setting the process of national reconciliation and political settlement in Afghanistan on a practical course.

The fate of Afghanistan and of the Afghan people is not a matter of indifference to us. This, I think, must be obvious. Afghanistan is our neighbour and our traditional and close partner. So it was, and so it will continue to be. Thus there is nothing strange in the fact that, having withdrawn our forces, we are in no way indifferent to the further evolution of affairs in Afghanistan - whether the will to peace and agreement will win through, or whether this courageous and wise people will be doomed to endless bloody strife. I am not giving away any big secret if I say that we have our own view of the optimum model of a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, one which we have worked out in close consultation with the Government in Kabul while maintaining contacts with other forces in Afghan society.

The most important thing now is not to let slip the chance that now presents itself in the Afghan drama - and such a chance exists, no one is disputing that - of setting in motion a process of full-blooded intra-Afghan political dialogue. Let me share with you some of our views on this subject.

Like most other regional conflicts, the Afghanistan problem has two clearly defined aspects - an internal and an external one. Given all the nuances that characterize the question of Afghanistan, the internal aspect undoubtedly has priority. This is quite understandable: no one can or is in a position to settle the Afghans' own affairs for them. Although, of course, those who in one way or another have been involved in the events in Afghanistan have an obligation to help the Afghans reach agreement. But only to help, not to impose their own formulas, still less to hedge them about with preliminary conditions.

We consider, and this view of ours is shared by the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, that the basic elements of an intra-Afghan settlement could be reduced to the following.

First. The cornerstone of the settlement process must be a broad dialogue among Afghans, with the participation of all - without exception - political forces active in Afghanistan and abroad. This concerns, first of all, those forces which have the country's national interests at heart and want the fratricidal war to end as soon as possible. And if the majority of those groups reach a mutual understanding on the beginning of a dialogue among Afghans, then the first, most important and most practical step will have been taken towards a solution of the question of Afghanistan.

Since there have been considerable difficulties in establishing a dialogue among Afghans, we believe that the participation, at the current preparatory stage, of the United Nations, which has great prestige and experience in such work, would contribute significantly to overcoming those difficulties.

Second. In order for the inter-Afghan dialogue to become a reality, the appropriate conditions must be created. In this regard, an end to the bloodshed in the country is of vital importance. We realize that immediate agreement on a complete and definitive end to the war, which even at the official count has lasted 11 years - and, in fact, much longer - would, most likely, be impossible. Therefore, the objective that needs to be set for the first stage is that of achieving at least a pause, a suspension of hostilities.

Third. A plan for an intra-Afghan settlement must be the main focus of the inter-Afghan dialogue. That dialogue could take, for example, the form of an all-Afghan peace conference which could be held in Afghanistan or in any third country with the agreement of the participants.

Fourth. It is, of course, the affair of the Afghans themselves to work out a mechanism for an intra-Afghan settlement. In our opinion, a good basis for that would be the plan proposed by the President of the Republic of Afghanistan at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade. This plan outlines the principal stages of a settlement, leaving the specifics to be filled in later. What is particularly valuable in the current circumstances is the plan's considerable flexibility, which opens up prospects for initiatives from both sides.

Fifth. One of the principles of the concept of the "transition period", which would begin with the convening of an all-Afghan peace conference and end with the establishment of a broadly representative Government in Afghanistan as a result of the free expression of the will of the Afghan people, could be maintenance of the status quo with regard to the armed forces and units of the opposing sides engaged in the dialogue, and the territories under their control. In other words, the question of unified armed forces and a single administration for the entire country would be postponed until the establishment of a broad-based Afghan government. That, of course, does not exclude the possibility of other alternatives. Much will depend on the atmosphere at the conference and on the attitude of its participants.

Sixth. The objectives of setting up an all-Afghan dialogue and strengthening the mutual confidence of the negotiating Afghan sides would certainly be furthered by a pledge on their part that they will recognize the results of the general elections and not attempt to "correct" them by force. Afghan President Najibullah, for his part has already made a declaration to that effect, at a meeting with journalists in Kabul on 24 January 1990.

Another important point regarding the elections which should put an end to the military confrontation: existing experience in opening up possibilities for solving regional conflicts, in particular in Namibia and Nicaragua, show that, in the organization of such elections, effective international monitoring to ensure that they are genuinely free and democratic is of great significance. In the case

of Afghanistan, the observers could include in our opinion, along with the United Nations, other organizations, for example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It seems appropriate that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, of which Afghanistan is an active member, should play a role in this area.

Such, in brief, are the "internal" aspects of a settlement. Of course, in a situation like the one in Afghanistan, it is very difficult to separate "internal" aspects from "external" ones as, for example, in the question of elections under international supervision. However, since we have already agreed - I repeat - on that somewhat artificial distinction, I shall now set forth our point of view with regard to the second group of issues.

The course of events in and around Afghanistan, and the very emergence of the question of Afghanistan are linked with a varying degree of involvement of a number of countries, especially the United States, Pakistan, Iran and the USSR. The conclusion of the Geneva Accords established the legal responsibility of the USSR and the United States as guarantors of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main point is that measures should finally be taken in Pakistan to end such interference from Pakistan territory so as to ensure that the Pakistan side complies with its obligations. There is an increasing need for agreement among the USSR, the United States, Pakistan and Iran on the basic features of a political solution of the Afghanistan problem.

Following those preliminary remarks, I shall again set forth our proposals and, in order to give a complete picture, I continue the original enumeration.

Seventh. In the light of the importance of reaching a consensus among the USSR, the United States, Pakistan and Iran, we propose the convening of a conference of these four countries, with the participation of the United Nations Secretary-General or his representatives. The venue for the conference could be Geneva, Rome or Vienna. In so far as we are aware of the problems Iran may encounter because of difficulties in its relations with the United States, the Soviet side could offer its services of mediation.

Eighth. It is clear, however, that such a conference would lack plenipotentiary powers unless the representatives of the warring Afghan forces - of both the Republic of Afghanistan and the various groupings that form the opposition - were to be invited to it.

In that connection, in order to prepare for the conference it would be useful to set up a working group at the expert level which would determine the participation and agenda and deal with organizational matters.

Ninth. One of the crucial issues on which it would be desirable to achieve international consensus is that of a complete cessation of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, whencesoever they might come, coupled with the declaration of a temporary halt or suspension in military actions. We have broached this issue several times with the American side, since we continue to believe that such a comprehensive approach alone can truly bring closer an end to bloodshed in Afghanistan.

Another point. In order to strengthen measures for the complete cessation of arms deliveries, it would be a good idea to work out a means of removing from Afghanistan all stocks of weapons and ensuring that they are not reintroduced into the country in future.

Tenth. The cessation of deliveries would be a precursor for the demilitarization of Afghanistan. The status of Afghanistan as a neutral and demilitarized State could be bolstered by an international conference. The USSR would be prepared to play a part, including a material part, in the creation of an international mechanism to supervise all stages of the demilitarization of Afghanistan.

We feel it goes without saying that the Soviet Union does not regard these ideas as the only possible framework for a solution of the Afghanistan question. But we are convinced that bringing them to fruition would enable a genuine start to be made in the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. We are hoping for a constructive reaction from those on whom movement towards a settlement of the Afghanistan question depends. We also count on the support of the United Nations Secretary-General. This would be fully in line with the mandate given him by the General Assembly. It is our deep conviction that the United Nations is still far from exhausting the valuable potential it possesses for creating a system most conducive to a settlement in Afghanistan.

For our part, we are ready for a constructive exchange of views with the United States, Pakistan and Iran on all aspects of a settlement in Afghanistan, including practical steps to bring it closer. The Soviet side, moreover, does not refuse to engage in dialogue with the field commanders and with the leaders of the group based in Peshawar and other groups, on the understanding that such contacts will not be misinterpreted as our acceptance of a "transitional government". We are also open to the idea of talks with Zakhir Shah and his circle, and with all those who would like to assist in solving the Afghanistan problem.

And now turning to what we regard as a crucial humanitarian issue: the freeing of our servicemen taken prisoner by the Afghan opposition. The Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people cannot but be concerned about the fate of those people of ours who one year after completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan continue to languish in captivity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not consider its mission accomplished until such time as all our prisoners are freed and are reunited with their families. We see this as our sacred duty and our direct official obligation.

Life and memory are inseparable. On such occasions as the present anniversary, we inevitably turn our thoughts towards what we have accomplished so far and what practical actions we can take for the future. And we are determined to maintain such a course. The Soviet Union is imbued with the desire and determination to do all in its power to ensure that neighbouring Afghanistan becomes once again a peaceful, independent, non-aligned State friendly to all peoples. So as to close for ever the bitter chapter of internecine strife in its history.

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Item 71 of the preliminary list**

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 16 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement issued by the Soviet Government on 14 February 1990.

I request you to circulate this text as an official document of the General Assembly under item 71 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) A. BELONOGOV

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

** A/45/50.

Statement issued by the Soviet Government on 14 February 1990

Hostilities have once again broken out in northern Ethiopia, in Eritrea. Detachments of the National Front for the Liberation of Eritrea have launched a full-scale offensive against Government troops. Blood is flowing and people are dying once again. Even without this development, the war is aggravating the disastrous situation of the population in the northern parts of Ethiopia, who are threatened by famine, and makes it difficult to provide international assistance to that population.

It is a matter of deep sorrow and concern that the armed hostilities in Eritrea have started up again after a prolonged period of calm, during which the Ethiopian Government and the Front successfully conducted two rounds of talks aimed at a settlement of the Eritrean question.

The armed conflict in Eritrea has already lasted for almost three decades and by its history demonstrates that it cannot be resolved by force. A political compromise is the only realistic method of settling the Eritrean question.

The Soviet Government urgently calls for a cessation of the hostilities in order that it may be possible at the earliest opportunity to sit down at the negotiating table and to embark on the search for mutually acceptable forms of national reconciliation. The official statement issued at Addis Ababa on 9 February 1990 about the readiness of the Ethiopian people henceforth to extend the hand of peace to the opposing party indicates that the above-mentioned method of resolving the Eritrean question is realistic.

We in the Soviet Union are convinced that it is of the utmost importance in this situation for the international community to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the north of Ethiopia and to refrain from any actions which might prolong or complicate that conflict.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 37 of the preliminary list*
QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 21 February 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to convey to Your Excellency the text of the joint statement and its attachments (see annex) issued at the conclusion of a meeting between representatives of the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, held in Madrid on 14 and 15 February 1990.

We request that the present note and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 37 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Crispin TICKELL

(Signed) Jorge VAZQUEZ

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Joint statement by the British and Argentine delegations

(Madrid - 15 February 1990)

1. Delegations of the British and Argentine Governments, as agreed at their meeting in Madrid in October 1989, met again in Madrid on 14 and 15 February 1990. The British delegation was led by Sir Crispin Tickell, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, and the Argentine delegation by Ambassador Lucio García del Solar, Special Representative of the Government of Argentina.

2. Both delegations reaffirmed that the formula on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, recorded in paragraph 2 of the joint statement of 19 October 1989, applied to this meeting and its consequences.

3. Both Governments, wishing to develop further friendship and co-operation between their two peoples, agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations following notification of the Protecting Powers. Embassies will be reopened shortly and Ambassadors appointed in accordance with international practice.

4. The British delegation announced the decision of the British Government to lift the Protection Zone established around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

5. Both Governments approved with satisfaction the final report of the "British-Argentine Working Group about measures to build confidence and avoid incidents in the military sphere" and decided, under the terms of the formula on sovereignty referred to in paragraph 2 of the present joint statement, the following:

(a) To establish an "Interim reciprocal information and consultation system" for movements of units of their armed forces in areas of the south-west Atlantic. The aims of this system are to increase confidence between the United Kingdom and Argentina and to contribute to achieving a more normal situation in the region without unnecessary delay (the text of this agreement is included as appendix I to the present joint statement);

(b) To establish a direct communication link between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the mainland in order to reduce the possibility of incidents, to limit their consequences in the case of occurrence, and to increase common knowledge of military activities in the south-west Atlantic (see appendix I);

(c) To agree on a set of rules of reciprocal behaviour for naval and air units of their armed forces when operating in proximity (see appendix II);

(d) To agree on a mechanism for emergencies aimed at facilitating air and maritime search and rescue operations in the south-west Atlantic (see appendix III);

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(e) To establish a system of exchange of information on the safety and control of air and maritime navigation (see appendix IV);

(f) To continue bilateral consideration of these matters and to review the measures agreed upon within one year from their coming into force.

6. The agreements described in paragraph 5 above will enter into force on 31 March 1990. On the same day, the decision mentioned in paragraph 4 above will be implemented.

7. Both delegations expressed the satisfaction of their Governments with the report of the Working Group on Fisheries, which met in Paris on 18 and 19 December 1989. It was agreed that both Governments should proceed - through their respective Foreign Ministries - to exchange available information on the operations of the fishing fleets, appropriate catch and effort statistics and analyses of the status of the stocks of the most significant offshore species in the maritime area of the Atlantic Ocean between latitude 45 degrees S and latitude 60 degrees S. They also agreed to assess jointly such information, and to explore bilaterally the possibilities for co-operation and conservation.

8. Both Governments decided to set up a Working Group on South Atlantic Affairs with the mandate to continue consideration of the issues entrusted to the two working groups mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the present joint statement. The Working Group will meet as frequently as the parties consider necessary; its first meeting will be held within one year of the date of this joint statement.

9. Both delegations considered the situation regarding contacts between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the mainland and agreed to continue considering this matter. The British delegation recognized the Argentine readiness to facilitate communications and trading opportunities between the Islands and the mainland.

10. Both delegations expressed their agreement to a visit to the cemetery on the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by close relatives of Argentine nationals buried there. The visit - based on humanitarian considerations - will take place under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Both Governments will seek the good offices of the ICRC and agree, through diplomatic channels, on the arrangements for and timing of the visit.

11. Both delegations agreed that the feasibility and desirability of a general co-operation agreement should be examined through diplomatic channels.

12. Both Governments, recognizing that the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments should encourage private initiative and increase prosperity in both States, agreed to begin, through diplomatic channels, the negotiation of an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement.

13. Both delegations agreed that it would be appropriate to abolish the requirement for visas for nationals of each country wishing to visit the other.

This measure would become effective once negotiations had been concluded through diplomatic channels.

14. Both Governments, conscious of the need to increase efforts to protect the environment, will work to ensure bilateral consultation and co-operation, including within the international institutions.

15. Both Governments, recognizing the threat that illicit drugs and drug abuse have created for all countries, agreed to explore ways of collaborating in this field, including exchanges of information, control of trafficking and an agreement to trace, freeze and confiscate the proceeds of drug trafficking. The Argentine delegation announced that its Government would be represented at the world conference on "Demand Reduction and the Cocaine Threat" to be held in London in April 1990.

16. Both delegations, noting the importance of current international trends towards greater political and economic interdependence and integration, agreed to consult through diplomatic channels on these trends, particularly those concerning the European Community and Latin America.

17. It was agreed that both Governments would jointly send the text of the present statement and its appendices to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for distribution as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council. The United Kingdom will transmit the present joint statement to the Presidency and Commission of the European Community, and the Government of Argentina will do likewise to the Organization of American States.

18. In conclusion, both delegations expressed their thanks to the Spanish Government for its generous hospitality and support.

APPENDIX I

Interim reciprocal information and consultation system

Both parties agree to establish an Interim Reciprocal Information and Consultation System for movements of units of their armed forces in areas of the south-west Atlantic. The aims of this system are to increase confidence between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Argentina and to contribute to achieving a more normal situation in the region without unnecessary delay. The system consists of the following provisions:

I. DIRECT COMMUNICATION LINK

A. A direct communication link will be established between the respective military authorities - under the supervision of both Foreign Ministries, in order to:

(a) Reduce the possibility of incidents and limit their consequences if they should occur;

(b) Increase common knowledge of military activities in the south-west Atlantic.

B. The respective military authorities will be:

(a) Argentine Naval Authority: Comandante del Area Naval Austral (Ushuaia);

(b) Argentine Air Authority: Jefe de la Novena Brigada Aerea (Comodoro Rivadavia);

(c) British Authority: Commander British Forces Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

C. It is agreed to establish a direct radio link between the respective authorities, which will include voice and/or telex transmissions. The link will be manned on a 24-hour basis and will be tested at least once a week. Technical information relating to equipment, frequencies and modalities of use will be exchanged through diplomatic channels.

D. It is agreed to establish a communications plan for radio links between units and stations of the parties. Technical information will be exchanged through diplomatic channels.

II. DEFINITION OF UNITS

A. Ship

Any ship belonging to the naval forces of the parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the Government and whose name appears in the naval list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline, and British Fleet Auxiliaries.

B. Aircraft

Any aircraft belonging to the armed forces of the parties, manned by a military crew who are under regular armed forces discipline.

C. Combatant units

Any ship or aircraft equipped with weapons systems or means of offensive power or offensive projection capabilities (naval examples: aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, fast patrol boats, amphibious ships or ships carrying troops; aircraft examples: strike aircraft, fighters, bombers, missile or troop-carrying aircraft).

III. RECIPROCAL INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY MOVEMENTS

1. Reciprocal written information will be provided through diplomatic channels, not less than 25 days in advance, about:

(a) Movements of naval forces involving four or more ships;

(b) Movements of aerial forces involving four or more aircraft;

(c) Exercises involving more than 1,000 men or more than 20 sorties by aircraft;

(d) Amphibious or airborne exercises involving more than 500 men or more than 20 sorties by aircraft.

The areas of application of this measure are:

For Argentine Forces: within rhumb lines joining the following geographical co-ordinates in the specified order: 46S 63W, 50S 63W, 50S 64W, 53S 64W, 53S 63W, 60S 63W, 60S 20W, 46S 20W, 46S 63W.

For British Forces: the area south of parallel 40°S and west of meridian 20°W and north of 60°S.

Each party will accept the presence of an observer ship from the other party in the vicinity of naval forces involving four or more ships engaged in manoeuvres within the relevant area of application.

2. Reciprocal notification of identity, intended track and purpose will be given, not less than 48 hours in advance, of a ship or an aircraft that intends to approach closer to coasts than 50 nautical miles by sea or 70 nautical miles by air.

When specific movements of the kind described in this paragraph are intended to be carried out by combatant units and might cause political or military difficulty to the Argentine Government or to the British Government, the notifying party will be informed immediately and mutual agreement will be necessary to proceed.

IV. VERIFICATION

Verification of compliance with the reciprocal information arrangements in provision III above will be by national means, by observer ships (as provided for in III.1), and by consultations through the direct communication link. If disagreement should arise, the parties would have recourse to the diplomatic channel.

V. RECIPROCAL VISITS

Reciprocal visits to military bases and naval units may be agreed through the diplomatic channel on a case-by-case basis.

VI. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

In situations not specifically covered in this system, it is understood that normal international practice will be applied on a reciprocal basis.

VII. DURATION

This system, including the reciprocal information measures, will be reviewed at regular diplomatic-technical meetings. The first of these meetings will take place within one year after the entry into force of the system and will be convened at a date to be agreed through the diplomatic channel.

APPENDIX II

Safety measures for naval and air units
when operating in proximity

When operating in proximity, naval and air units of the parties will comply with the following general regulations and rules:

(a) Naval and air units of the parties shall avoid any movement or action that might be interpreted as a hostile act or an act carried out with hostile intent;

(b) Naval units of the parties shall manoeuvre in a manner that clearly shows their intentions and shall strictly observe the letter and spirit of the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea of 1972;

(c) Air units shall use the greatest caution and prudence when manoeuvring in proximity to units of the other party, in order to contribute to safety and avoid mutual interference;

(d) Naval and air units of the parties shall not simulate attacks nor aim guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, other weapons or fire control radars in the direction of units of the other party;

(e) Naval and air units of the parties shall not launch any object in the direction of passing ships or aircraft of the other party, nor use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate their navigation bridges;

(f) Naval and air units of the parties operating in proximity shall avoid the darkening of lights and, in this respect, shall comply with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 and the provisions of annex VI of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944;

(g) On no account shall the communication and detection systems of units of the other party be interfered with or disrupted;

(h) A prompt exchange of information shall be conducted in the event of any occurrence that might cause concern to the other party.

APPENDIX III

Maritime and air search and rescue

When communication or co-ordination is required in relation to maritime and air search and rescue (SAR), the following procedures will apply:

(a) The headquarters of the British Forces in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) shall inform the regional SAR co-ordination centres of the South-West Atlantic Area:

Maritime SAR: Ushuaia Maritime SAR Co-ordination Centre

Air SAR: Comodoro Rivadavia Air SAR Co-ordination Centre

(b) Maritime SAR operations shall be conducted in accordance with the SAR manual of the International Maritime Organization and the SAR manual for merchant ships. Air SAR operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of annex XII to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its amendments;

(c) In the event that joint participation in a SAR incident becomes necessary, the headquarters of the British Forces in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and the appropriate Argentine SAR Co-ordination Centre will co-ordinate their activities.

APPENDIX IV

Safety of navigation

1. The parties will exchange all relevant information so that Argentina, the Regional Co-ordinator of Navarea VI, as defined by the International Maritime Organization, may issue the appropriate notices to mariners for that area.

2. In order to enhance flight safety, the parties agreed:

(a) To facilitate the operation of Argentine Flight Information Centres by supplying the information necessary for Argentina to provide the Air Traffic Control, Warning, Search and Rescue, Communication and Meteorological Services within the Argentine Flight Information Regions (FIR);

(b) To exchange information between the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and Comodoro Rivadavia (CRV) Flight Information Centre for identification of aircraft in flight in the FIRs, in particular on flights in the vicinity of coastal areas;

(c) To respond positively in an emergency to requests to provide alternative landing facilities at their airfields for each other's aircraft and aircraft of third parties; and

(d) To exchange aeronautical information about the airfields of both parties (navigation, approach and surface facilities).